A fundamental issue in order to proceed towards European defense is to identify a governance system capable of deciding and acting in the necessary times in the face of the urgencies and needs that may arise over time on the defense level. Having a European military instrument and never being able to use it due to a decision-making system that assigns the right of veto to each member country would be ridiculous.
The link between foreign, security and defense policy is clear. A European defense, like any military instrument, must be at the service of a foreign and security policy. The same issue emerged during the attempt to build a European Defense Community in the 1950s – and many of the contents of that Treaty, which was then not ratified, continue to maintain their relevance and validity. Then France with Monnet and Pleven proposed to create a European defense. Italy, with Alcide De Gasperi, starting from a proposal by Altiero Spinelli, posed the problem of also creating a European Political Community.
Creating a European defense requires political union, that is, the completion of the federalization process of the European Union, providing it with a true foreign and security policy. This involves the creation of a federal government structure responsible for foreign, security and defense policy. That is, of a Union that truly speaks with one voice in the world.
How to finance a European defense?
To move towards European defense we need to agree on how to finance it. National defenses are financed by national budgets, that is, by taxes and public debt issued by states. Once fully operational, European defense should be financed from the EU budget, …
To do this, the Commission must be given the powers of representation of the EU which it currently holds only in matters of trade, where the Union has exclusive competence and the Commission negotiates treaties with other countries and represents us in the World Trade Organisation. You cannot have a European foreign policy if member states have different positions in international organizations.
Recently, on the UN resolutions on the ceasefire in Gaza, member states were divided into those in favor, against, and abstentions. Given the difference in opinion, some mistakenly conclude that a European foreign policy is impossible. But in each European state there are people and parties with those different positions: diversity of opinions in politics is normal. But in the states there is a government capable of taking a position. The same goes for the EU: to have a foreign policy you don’t need an unrealistic homogeneity of views, but institutional tools to decide democratically, i.e. a federal government.
Ultimately, political union and the representation of the EU in international fora implies the Europeanization of the French seat in the United Nations Security Council, just as monetary union was the Europeanization of the German mark.
Naturally, this can be done gradually, for example by providing for the participation of a Commission Representative alongside the French one, and with the latter’s commitment to sticking to the decisions and positions taken at EU level.
To then arrive at direct representation of the EU at the UN. Especially if, when it established its own autonomous defense capacity, the EU decided to unilaterally apply Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which requires member states to place troops at the disposal of the UN in a structural and permanent manner. . If the EU created the Rapid Intervention Force of 60,000 units decided in Helsinki in 1999, and decided to make 5,000 of them available to the UN. Such a choice would pave the way for a reform of the UN Security Council, which would also allow for better representation of the other large areas of the world. And it would send a clear signal that the creation of a European defense does not aim to make the EU a military superpower, but to be able to contribute to stability and peace in the world.
It would be a very strong push for regional integrations in other areas, so that they can be represented as such in the Security Council. That is, it could have an extraordinarily positive effect in general with respect to the various processes of integration and therefore stabilization of different areas of the world, as well as at the level of cooperation between all these large areas on a global level.
All this implies strengthening the competences and governing powers of the European Commission, which is the embryo of an EU parliamentary government, because it is the executive that manages the budget and policies and is accountable to Parliament. In the elections, European parties present their candidate for the presidency of the Commission in addition to their programme, similarly to what happens in national parliamentary elections.
It is therefore a question of providing within the Commission not only a specific commissioner for the defense industry, but also a commissioner for defense with adequate powers, as well as strengthening those of the High Representative for foreign and security policy. We will need to create a defense commission in the European Parliament. And above all, modify the decision-making process on these competences, going beyond the rule of unanimity in the Council, where the governments of the member states sit, to move to the qualified majority. This is essential to be able to make decisions in a reasonable time, especially in the face of crises.
While unanimity makes blackmail possible by individual states, sometimes for issues that have nothing to do with the decision to be made, but simply to exploit the opportunity posed by unanimous decisions on an urgent issue that requires everyone, to get something in exchange on completely different dossiers. This demonstrates how unanimity is both an inefficient and anti-democratic system.
