How the economy and security will change in India after Modi’s half-way victory

How the economy and security will change in India after Modi’s half-way victory
How the economy and security will change in India after Modi’s half-way victory

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On June 4, the counting of votes for the general elections in India concluded, valid for assigning the 543 seats of the 18th Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Federal Republic. The final results confirmed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the coalition led by Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as the leading force in the country even if with a small margin and a result well below expectations. In particular, for the first time since 2014, the BJP has lost the absolute majority of seats in the Lok Sabha and, therefore, Modi will now be forced to negotiate with the parties of his coalition to guarantee himself a third consecutive mandate, a privilege that has so far belonged to the leader historian Jawaharlal Nehru. The reduction of the majority emerges clearly when looking at the final results. According to the Times of India, the NDA won 293 seats, compared to 353 in the 2019 elections, while the BJP went from 303 seats to the current 240 in five years, below the critical threshold of 272 needed to have a majority in the Lower house. At the same time, there was an excellent result from the oppositions led by the Indian National Congress (INC), which went from 52 seats in 2019 to 99 in 2024. Overall, thanks also to an effective policy of variable geometry alliances, the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDI Alliance), i.e. the coalition of opposition forces, won approximately 234 seats.

THE LIKELY SCENARIO: MODI-TER

In this context, the most probable scenario remains that of a “Modi-ter”, with a government team capable of reflecting the demands of the parties allied to the BJP, the real winners of this electoral round. Among these is the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), led by Chandrababu Naidu, capable of winning 16 of the 17 seats contested in the south-eastern state of Andhra Pradesh and today the main ally of the BJP. The TDP leader has already started talks with the BJP leaders and among his requests to support a new Modi Government there could be Special Category Status for Andhra Pradesh, which would guarantee additional funds useful for completing significant infrastructure projects, and also some key ministries. Another relevant player will be the Janata Dal (United), the party representing the Chief Minister of the State of Bihar, known for having changed its alignment several times in recent years, oscillating between majority and opposition.

The setback of the BJP, which had been accompanied by the optimistic electoral slogan “Abki Baar, 400 Paar”, which indicated the coalition’s objective of the threshold of 400 seats, is mainly linked to the decline in consensus in the Hindu heart of the country and , in particular, in some key states such as Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Maharastra. Modi’s coalition essentially halved the seats in UP, overtaken by the INDI Alliance which obtained 43 out of the 80 up for grabs. Here, the performance of the Samajwadi Party, a party allied with Rahul Gandhi’s INC, proved to be decisive. An effective electoral campaign, characterized by popular proposals such as the introduction of support measures for women, and the excellent management of candidatures in line with the complex local caste system, contributed to favoring the good result of the opposition. Significant, in the context of UP, was the defeat of the BJP in the district of Faizabad, where Ayodhya is located, a place at the center of the news last January for the inauguration of a temple dedicated to the god Ram built on the site of the Babri Masjid mosque overthrown by Hindu fanatics in 1992. Compared to 2019, the mix of Hindutva and nationalism promoted by the BJP, therefore, seems not to have worked, just as the candidate selection process proved to be flawed. What prevailed, however, was discontent linked to inflation, mainly of food, and youth unemployment.

Even in Maharastra, the dynamics of local politics, such as the split of entities such as the Shiv Sena, proved decisive and allowed the opposition to impose itself in a state that had been dominated by the BJP in the 2019 elections. The BJP’s performance was not optimal it is also registered in medium-sized states, with the loss of 11 seats in Rajasthan and 8 in Karnataka. In the state of Haryana, where in 2019 the BJP had obtained all 10 seats up for grabs, the opposition managed to snatch 5 from the majority by leveraging, among other things, the protests against the recruitment reform in the Armed Forces, known such as the Agnipath scheme, and on those of farmers who have long been asking the Government for a guaranteed minimum price for their products. The results in some strongholds such as Gujarat, homeland of the leader Modi, Madhya Pradesh and the National Capital Territory of Delhi contributed to containing the decline in support for the majority. Also noteworthy is the good result of the NDA in the southern states of India, such as Orissa and Telangana, driven by an electoral campaign less attentive to religious aspects and more focused on local factors and the international successes of the Government.

THE SITUATION OF THE ECONOMY IN INDIA

Beyond the territorial specificities, the Indian vote returned the image of a country partially dissatisfied with its economic condition in these post-pandemic years. High youth unemployment and uneven economic growth, driven by capital-intensive sectors, and in any case still rather limited compared to the country’s potential and level of development, seem to be some of the themes behind the good result achieved by the opposition. At the same time, the international successes of the Modi government do not seem to have had an impact, if not partially, on the local political dynamics at the center of the national debate. Overall, the months of election campaign have also confirmed a growing polarization, an aspect that will likely characterize Indian politics also during the probable third Modi Government.

Furthermore, the election indicated a partial downsizing of the figure of Modi himself, an aspect that is probably not entirely unwelcome to some sectors of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the organization inspired by the dictates of Hindutva of which the BJP is essentially political arm. An extraordinary communicator and charismatic leader, Modi in recent years has strongly personalized the party and the ideologies it promotes, obscuring the role of the organizations that favored its rise and irritating some sectors of them. Among the reasons for the collapse of consensus of the Prime Minister’s party in UP, some Indian reporters have pointed out the poor presence of RSS volunteers in the election campaign. Furthermore, the downsizing of the BJP in India’s most populous state risks partially undermining the image of another party leader long considered Modi’s natural successor, Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. At the same time, the results of the polls would seem to be able to revive, at least in part, Gandhi’s INC, fresh from a long series of defeats at national and local level.

THE CONSEQUENCES IN INTERNAL POLITICS

Looking ahead, the 2024 elections will have a strong impact on the dynamics of Indian domestic politics, starting with the appointments for the new executive. Furthermore, the absence of a large margin of advantage for the BJP makes the plans to amend the Constitution that Modi’s party seemed to be aiming for complex. The same divisive policies adopted by the leadership in recent years could be subject to partial rethinking, given the presence of a stronger opposition than in the past. In this context, it is reasonable to expect greater attention, in the short term, for the development of work-intensive sectors and for policies to support youth employment. Still on the economic level, the greatest fears concern the fact that a weak Government may pay less attention to public finances, preferring expansionary policies aimed at consolidating consensus.

THE CONSEQUENCES IN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

On the foreign and security front, however, the recent results should not impact India’s “grand strategy” and its international posture. The process of rapprochement with the United States, as well as the conflict with Pakistan and China, are factors that will therefore characterize India’s external action even in the short to medium term. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the BJP will focus attention mainly on internal dynamics in the coming months, in an attempt to partially recover the lost ground. In this regard, we note the possible absence of Prime Minister Modi at the G7 summit in Italy, due to the negotiations for the formation of the Government which could prove more complex than expected.

(Article published on CeSI)

 
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