Macron – Ansa
What emerges from the polls on 9 June 2024 is a Europe that looks more to the right than 5 years ago and, above all, sends a stop signal to the integration process rewarding, as far as the data is still partial, the parties most skeptical about the process of delegating the most important decisions for the continent to Brussels.
On an overall level, however, the so-called Ursula majority that voted Von der Leyen as head of the European Commission in 2019, i.e. popular, socialists and liberals, could still be “forced”. The proportions change, however, with a success of the People’s Party (led by the Germans and Spaniards) and a decline of the Socialists (with the Dutch exception), the slowdown of the Liberals sharper, even for the collapse of the French Macron supporters (early elections will be held in Paris, the most important result of the electoral round for now).
However, it will be unclear how the two growing families, Conservatives and Reformists (by Meloni) and Identity and Democracy (with Le Pen), will manage the result: the second grouping could have a significant reshuffle (it expelled the AdD Germans at the end of the legislature), while the first could try to convince the EPP to form a centre-right alliance. Very important will be those who are currently “non-members” of the main European political families, esteemed as the fourth force and predictably courted by everyone to obtain their consent.
The percentage of voter turnout was indicated on the eve of the vote as one of the key factors to evaluate the degree of interest and participation that community institutions arouse in EU citizens. Five years ago the overall participation in the vote was 50%, the slight further decline to around 48%, below half of potential voters, confirms the tendency not to consider the expression of one’s political preference as relevant and significant. Obviously, we are anticipating a downward trend that all mature democracies are observing in recent years.
The vote for the European Parliament was inevitably an important test for governments, majorities and oppositions in all 27 EU states. In some, in particular, it has taken on central importance. Avvenire.it deals with Italy in another article.
In France, the first major and most sensational shock of this electoral cycle. Marine Le Pen’s Rassenblement National is by far the largest party with 32%. An absolute novelty whose consequences are still to be evaluated. In the 2022 elections it had collected 17% in the second round, placing itself behind President Macron’s party and the left-wing cartel. The Ensemble coalition of the head of the Elysée dropped from 38%, in the narrowest form of Renaissance, to 15% with the uncharismatic leader Valérie Hayer, while Raphaël Glucksmann’s socialists obtained a good result at 14%.
For Paris it is a shock widely predicted by the polls but still disruptive now that it materializes with the votes actually cast by the citizens. A president who is increasingly active in military support for Ukraine finds himself in a strong minority compared to a right-wing formation which was pro-Putin and is now only tepidly aligned with the Ukrainian resistance but still suspected of friendly relations with the Kremlin. The identity, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and anti-green policies issues typical of Le Pen paid off, but she softened her tone and tried to take on the profile of an international leader in her long-term bid for the presidency. It is no coincidence that the leader of the RN Bardella called for early political elections and Macron immediately announced the dissolution of Parliament, trying to overcome the situation and take back the scene. An undertaking that promises to be very difficult. His bet is on a re-edition of the “republican front” to overturn the balance of power in the country in the June 30 elections, perhaps focusing on increasing turnout.
In Germany, the second earthquake from the polls. In Berlin, the coalition executive led by the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, according to the first results, emerges with broken bones and sees his consensus significantly reduced. The SPD, which 5 years ago had collected only 15% and then rose by ten points in the 2021 elections, collapses to its worst result ever, around 14%. The CDU is flying from 24% three years ago to 30%, followed by the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland which has risen above 16% as the second party in the country. The groups that support Scholz currently represent a minority, given that the Greens are stuck at 12%. In the end, AfD – a party that had seen scandals, shadows of links with Russia, denialist statements on the Gestapo and the Hitler regime – denied the polls that showed it slowing down compared to the potential peaks of the previous months. Despite the street demonstrations against Alternative für Deutschland, in which even the president of the Bundesbank Nagel participated, a part of the country, especially in the East, chose this anti-system force which planned a forced re-immigration of foreigners from Germany towards the countries of origin.
In Belgium, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, in tears, announced his resignation due to the disappointing results of his coalition. In Spain, the People’s Party overtakes the Socialists in government; in Poland, the civic coalition narrowly surpasses the Pis. In Austria, the right-wing FPOE becomes the leading force and aims for government. In Hungary, Orbán wins but loses ground and Magyar opposition gains strength.
They were billed as the first wartime European elections. We still don’t know how much the war factor played a role, but it certainly could have been one of the main factors on a continental scale that oriented the vote. Which, as always, follows national logics, more or less accentuated, due to the fact that every single country has its own lists and voters are asked to choose between the parties and candidates of their nation.
They were also the elections that Russia had explicitly said it wanted to influence – with more or less legitimate means – by supporting forces that are less favorable to military support of Ukraine and better disposed towards the Kremlin. It will be easy for Vladimir Putin today to compare European abstentionism to the almost 80% of voters who were declared in March for his plebiscite election. Obviously, the transparency of the vote is not comparable. It will be interesting to understand in the coming weeks how much the propaganda fueled by Moscow may have had on the overall result and on individual lists specifically. Of course, the forces that are less oriented towards supporting Kiev are growing, which will certainly cheer up the Kremlin.
