Look at the substance of the problem. We can certainly evaluate the various factors, not exactly of specific merit, which led Italian MEPs in the European Parliament to abstain or vote against the reform of the Stability Pact. Contradictions and second thoughts can also be detected. But we cannot ignore an evaluation of the contents which is not distorted by the other various possible purposes of the vote, starting with those connected with the imminent campaign for the European elections.
The reform of the Pact represents a step forward compared to the configuration currently in force, which was suspended for approximately five years, first and foremost in relation to Covid. But we must ask ourselves whether the reform actually responds to the complete overcoming of a vision dominated by austerity and whether it is able to effectively contribute to relaunching growth and competitiveness in the Union. From this point of view however, despite the particular treatment of some types of investments, the objective of achieving the “golden rule” – the exclusion of public investments from the prescribed constraints, a fundamental measure to shake an area from asphyxiated growth – has remained a simple aspiration of a number of countries. The weight of the so-called frugal partners meant that the compromise achieved, after the rejection of the original project of the EU Commission which presented aspects that could not be underestimated, was unbalanced towards the area of the rigorists reluctant to completely abandon a belief in austerity, despite today their main reference point, Germany, is in a state of recession. Balancing public finances and relaunching growth as well as competitiveness are, therefore, very disharmonious results.
Of course, those who have a debt exceeding 60 percent of GDP do not have to reduce it annually, as in the Pact currently in force, by one twentieth of the part exceeding this percentage, but the 1 percent reduction in the ratio for excess debts remains relevant. 90 percent of the Product. If the deficit is higher than 3 percent of GDP and the country concerned is under procedure for excessive deficit, the obligation for an annual reduction of 0.5 percent is triggered. Debt reduction plans above the aforementioned 60 percent will have to be presented to Brussels by individual countries and will have a four-year duration, extendable to seven years, but on the basis of conditions regarding reforms and investments. However, here the vicious circle of constraints on investments appears, weighing on the new parameters, but at the same time being considered a factor that allows for the lengthening of debt reduction times. Since the Maastricht parameters remain unchanged in the reform – 60 percent debt/GDP and 3 percent for the deficit – at least the paths for adjustment could have been less restrictive. If we were not willing or able to discuss the parameters in question, certainly an extraordinary commitment for which perhaps the conditions did not exist given the position of the aforementioned rigorists, a greater availability for an effective and widely shared agreement could have constituted, yes, a true review of governance, taking important steps towards greater integration with the use of common European initiatives financed with equally common debt. Now, since after an obvious passage in the Council the new regulation will come into force with the expected times, on the one hand, obviously, it will have to be respected, but on the other, the electoral test and its results cannot be considered irrelevant on governance, as if it were sanctioned by bodies now “in articulo” the intangibility of their decisions for a five-year period. And the results of the regulations on the subject so far are extremely disappointing, as Antonio Fazio has demonstrated in his writings.
It is true that, beyond the rules, great attention must always be paid to the way in which institutions, markets and investors look at the solidity of a country, its economic-financial balance and its prospects. But not at all negligible components are growth and the so-called good debt, according to the definition given at the time by Mario Draghi himself in a famous article, which then perhaps passed into oblivion, and is precisely investment spending. Recently, the figure of the famous US Treasury Minister, Alexander Hamilton, who unified the debt of individual states, a historic decision that represented the fundamental step for the American Federation, has been significantly recalled. If we look at the previews of the Draghi Report on European competitiveness and that of Enrico Letta on the single market, in the face of these breath-taking prospects we must note a vision entirely short-sightedly based on a Pact which continues to underestimate the second term of the hendiadys – growth. Yet, when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, the Italian Treasury Minister, a prestigious personality such as Guido Carli, shook his hand, as he himself later said, but he was assured a broad autonomy of national policies, something which unfortunately did not was respected. Respect for the new rules, therefore, but not abandonment of the need for real reform: we must not abandon a criterion for evaluating real or presumed progress. In this case, we must ask ourselves what are the ultimate consequences of policies and laws for citizens. The community integration process must be able to walk on the legs of European women and men.
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