Why Russia could turn the war in Ukraine by summer: expert analysis

Many deaths to conquer, defend, lose and then reconquer a few hundred meters, or at most a few kilometers of territory. There war in Ukraine, from this point of view, it seems like the First World War. The Russian armed forces move regardless of losses. Historical legacy of the armies of the Tsars and the Red Army. Just to conquer Bakhmut, the Wagner mercenary group lost 20 thousand men, according to the BBC and Mediazona. More than the Russian deaths in ten years of war in Afghanistan.

Recent offensives on the Ukrainian front have similar casualty rates. The attacking units, however, are smaller: “Platoons (about 30 men, ed.) or at most a battalion (between 500 and 1000 soldiers, ed.) are used,” he tells Fanpage.it the reserve officer of the Finnish Armed Forces Pasi Paroinenwhich from the Russian invasion onwards has observed satellite images and analyzed every available source on a war that Helsinki feels is very close to for the Black Bird group.

According to Paroinen, the Russians could close the game. By attacking multiple sectors in force and in a coordinated manner with armored units and air power, they would definitively undermine Kyiv’s defenses. But so far they haven’t. “For structural reasons or to save strength for the final blow,” explains the expert. The fact is that “the window of opportunity is closing”. The time “is now, during the summer.” And Putin should exploit it. Unless he wants to drag it out “and wait for the results of the American elections in November”.

We speak with Pasi Paroinen via video conference from Helsinki.

Russia claims to have 60 percent of Donetsk territory in its hands. It is exactly the same percentage he had in early October 2022, when he proclaimed the annexation of the self-proclaimed republic. For those few kilometers conquered, lost and reconquered, tens of thousands of soldiers died. What kind of tactics and strategy do the forces in the field have?

The Russians are slowly gaining ground, conquering small villages after the fall of Avdiivka. Despite this minimal progress, they have made more progress this spring than the Ukrainians did last summer. However, their advance is costly and slow.

After Avdiivka, some experts believed that the Donbass region was open to Russian forces. But it’s not as if they’ve really spread. Why?

The slowness of the Russian advance allows the Ukrainians to stabilize crises by sending reserves from other sectors. This pattern repeated itself around Ocheretyne. The Ukrainian defense was collapsing but the Russians failed to take advantage quickly, allowing Ukrainian forces to stabilize the situation. This has happened multiple times on multiple fronts. As in Kharkiv Oblast.

The Russians can successfully launch local offensives, creating temporary crises for the Ukrainians. However, Russia’s inability to create multiple simultaneous crises makes it relatively easy for the Ukrainians to manage them even with their limited resources.

Kyiv has serious problems of lack of personnel, especially on the front line. But if the Russians can only create isolated crises, they can do it. Multiple defensive crises at the same time in different areas would make the situation significantly worse.

Is it true that the Russians took the village of Ryzhivka, Sumy region, as the Chechen leader Kadyrov said?

Satellite reports and observations are conflicting. However, Ryzhivka would be just one of many border villages that changed hands several times in this war. Not a strategically significant achievement.

In the Russian offensives we see the infantry at work with few tanks and without real air support, despite control of the skies. An effective blitzkrieg is not done like this. What is Moscow doing?

It’s not just Moscow. Both sides are conducting limited infantry attacks, often with platoons or at most battalions. Which leads to heavy losses.

Using large units is a challenge for both the Russians and the Ukrainians. They struggle to effectively coordinate air, artillery, infantry and armored vehicle attacks. The Russians attempted large-scale mechanized attacks during the Battle of Avdiivka, achieving mixed results and losing many men.

Currently, Putin’s armed forces seem to want to spare their armored vehicles. Or perhaps they have too few of them available. The assaults rely on infantry alone. As seen in the Kharkiv direction.

But do the Russians really want to take Kharkiv? Because we haven’t seen a real lunge.

The Russians probably aimed to provoke intense fighting in Kharkiv to attract Ukrainian reserves and attempt a breakthrough from another part of the front. Whatever the intentions, it didn’t go the way they wanted.

The situation stabilized and the Ukrainians counterattacked in Vovchansk. The poor quality of Russian infantry and the effective Ukrainian response played a key role.

The Russians managed to lure Ukrainian reserves, but did not launch major offensives elsewhere. There is constant pressure on all lines, but no significant new offense. Contrary to what I expected. Because the time window available to Russia is not infinite.

If the Ukrainians consolidate the defense of Kharkiv and counterattack, they will likely suffer heavy losses. But if successful they could then redistribute their reserves to other areas. Thus the possibility of a Russian thrust on Chasiv Yar or Ocheretyne would become impossible. Also because the new Ukrainian mobilization postponed for so long will soon bring fresh forces online. The window of opportunity is closing for Putin’s soldiers.

Many deaths for few results?

Moscow may have started the Kharkiv operation prematurely or faced complications, resulting in poor synchronization of their forces. It seems unlikely that the aim was to take the city. The forces involved were not sufficient for such an objective. Instead, they probably aimed to get close enough to use artillery against Kharkiv, complicating the situation for the Ukrainians and drawing troops to them in force. The strategy was not successful.

How much does the permission given to the Ukrainians to use American missiles to hit launch systems in Russia matter, on the Kharkiv front and elsewhere? According to the Institute for the Study of War, the limits imposed by Washington still leave safe more than 84 percent of Russian territory which in theory could be hit by the Atacms…

This new capability will not dramatically change warfare. It will allow Ukraine to strike valuable targets such as air defenses and supply centers. This can harm Russia tactically. Not enough to win the war, though. Unless you can coordinate these missile strikes on single targets to large ground operations. And then the quantity of these armaments supplied by the West to Kyiv remains insufficient.

Would Putin do well to exploit the current Ukrainian inferiority and hurry up and win the war? By making a relationship between the production potential of NATO and that of Russia, in the long run the chances diminish, according to the Kremlin leader…

Russia’s ability to conduct major offensives could decline if it does not act this summer, likely due to dwindling ammunition supplies. Western support for Ukraine and Russia’s challenge to maintain a large-scale offensive are critical factors in the conflict’s progression. And the West is always behind the curve. It only moves when there is a major crisis on the battlefield. He does not act in advance to avoid it. Now something has moved. But at the moment no significant effects are seen.

So why don’t the Russians really try to make the final push? Because they continue to send forward only a few platoons or at most an infantry battalion. Without tanks or fighter-bombers to provide crucial support?

They could still do it. They have superiority in men and artillery. But not even their ammunition is infinite. They need to strike this summer. If they don’t, it could be an indication of serious problems for their military. The time is now. Or in the next few weeks. Perhaps the final offensive has already begun. Perhaps it is still early to understand its potential. Of course, summer, like ammunition, is not infinite.

But does Putin really want to close the game or does he prefer to drag it out as much as possible? Just recently at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum he explained how Russia’s economy is benefiting from the current situation, including sanctions. Hasn’t continuous war somehow become necessary for the regime?

I don’t want to speculate on what they think in the Kremlin. I only know that, from a military point of view, the window of opportunity for Moscow is open and will close at the end of the summer. Especially since the Ukrainians will have more soldiers, after the reduction of the age for conscription. However, Putin may also want to save his forces to strike when he knows who the next American president is. The US presidential elections in November and the possibility of a Trump victory loom over this war.

But do you really believe that Ukraine can take back its territories? Winning the war? Is it possible, against a nuclear power? At the Sam Petersburg Forum, Putin was on stage with Karaganov, the political scientist who advised him to launch “preventive” atomic bombs. Even in some European cities…

Moscow has been threatening to use its nuclear weapons since the beginning of the conflict. And although many red lines set by the Kremlin have been crossed, this has never happened. The fact is that using such tactical ordnance on the battlefield is impractical. And that NATO’s reaction could wipe out the Russian armed forces from the theater of war.

That said, a Kyiv victory is not impossible. There are precedents in military history where worse situations have been successfully resolved. But the difficulties remain enormous. Above all, Ukraine should solve its many organizational problems. Bring order to his rear. Untie the internal knots that limit the effectiveness of its action. Otherwise it will never be able to launch a counter-offensive involving multiple units at brigade level (over 5 thousand men, ed.). And to clear the Russian minefields.

Western help remains the key. Which, with what can happen in the politics of democratic countries, is not entirely obvious. On the tactical-military level, Ukraine can still win. But the strategic and political unknowns greatly reduce his chances.