The United States and China continue to have a fundamental interest in common: that of avoiding – or at least postponing – the scenario of a direct collision, which would be detrimental to both. However, on everything else – from the future of Taiwan to the “limitless” friendship between Beijing and Moscow, from the American ban on the Chinese app TikTok to the threat of new US tariffs on Chinese steel, up to the issue of human rights in Xinjiang, in Tibet and Hong Kong – the two superpowers do not agree on anything. In recent times, despite the improvement in relations established in November during the meeting between the two presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in California, the reasons for tension have only increased, transforming the three-day visit to China of the Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a test of the degree of tolerance that Washington and Beijing intend to maintain in the context of a now structural rivalry.
The big issues of geopolitics – the Russian war in Ukraine on the one hand and tensions in the South China Sea – will inevitably be at the center of Blinken’s mission in China, which will have its highlight on Friday. On the agenda is a face-to-face meeting (expected to last six hours) with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, but a meeting with Xi Jinping is also widely expected. Before flying to Beijing, the top American diplomat will stop in Shanghai, for a program that includes a meeting with Chinese students and participation in a sporting event: the type of “popular diplomacy” – underlines the New York Times – which would be was unthinkable a year ago, when bilateral relations seemed close to the breaking point, especially regarding Taiwan. Today the situation is undoubtedly better, but analysts warn that the climate could change for the worse, with “uncomfortable” topics on the agenda such as discussions on the sale of dual-use products (civil and military) by China to Russia, or as the opposing views of military maneuvers in the South China Sea.
The primary purpose of Blinken’s trip, as leaked by the State Department, is to warn the People’s Republic of China that the United States and its European allies are no longer willing to tolerate the sale of weapons components and dual-use items to China. Russia, a trade believed to be helping Vladimir Putin rebuild and modernize his weapons industry, allowing him to step up attacks on Ukraine. Washington – reports the Wall Street Journal – is evaluating sanctions that would cut some Chinese banks out of the global financial system: a powerful tool of coercion with which it hopes to convince Beijing to stop supporting Moscow’s military production. China has already made it clear that it does not want interference in what it considers “normal trade and economic exchanges with Russia and other countries in the world, conducted on the basis of equality and mutual benefit”.
The other major obstacle in US-China relations (destined, at best, to remain so) concerns the future of Taiwan. Beijing has outlined – in a long article published on WeChat by the Department of North American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – what its “five main points” are for Sino-American relations: correct understanding (the “first button”) , the strengthening of dialogue, the effective management of differences, the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation and the need to jointly shoulder the responsibilities of large countries. More than 20 mechanisms have been established or restarted since the November 2023 summit between Biden and Xi, but communication should not be an end in itself. This is especially true, from the Chinese point of view, when it comes to the security cordon that the United States has built around Taiwan through a network of alliances ranging from Japan to the Philippines, from Australia to North Korea. “The so-called American alliance system is a product of the Cold War, reflecting outdated thinking and a zero-sum mentality.” The American side “must not touch the red lines” on Taiwan, democracy and human rights. And again: “China is resolute and unswerving in safeguarding its national sovereignty, security and development interests, and will clearly declare its position and make explicit demands on issues such as Taiwan, economic, trade and technological issues and the South China Sea,” the article also reads.
China claims “a constructive role” on issues such as the Middle East, Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula, in the hope that “the US will do the same”. For Beijing, it is a question of reversing course, given that the recent American deployment of missile systems in the Philippines “has intensified tensions in the region and increased the risk of misunderstandings and incorrect assessments”. Fingers were also pointed at the Aukus pact, the US-GB-Australia security agreement, and the insistence on the development of nuclear submarines, something that “has unleashed serious risks of atomic proliferation and intensified the arms race. The Asia-Pacific region is nobody’s backyard and should not become an arena of rivalry between great powers,” is Beijing’s far from disinterested warning.
The White House’s assumption is that, although Beijing may adopt a tough tone on the most controversial topics, it generally intends to continue to commit to stable relations, at least for the next few years, as it finds itself facing complex economic challenges. China’s economy is slowing, and Beijing has adopted a softer diplomatic tone to attract more foreign investment. This assessment helps to better understand the American attitude, from which emerges a certain self-confidence in making Blinken’s visit coincide with two moves disliked by the Chinese: the green light from Congress for a new military aid package for Taiwan (worth of 8 billion euros) and the approval of a law that could ban the use of TikTok in the USA (where it has around 170 million users) for fear of espionage and collection of sensitive data.
As the New York Times points out, the political season in the United States also looms as a complication. As the presidential election approaches, Democrats and Republicans are competing to appear tougher on China. If former President Donald Trump is re-elected, he could reverse efforts by Beijing and Washington to stabilize relations. It is also to stand up to him that a few days ago Biden asked, during an election event in Pennsylvania (a stronghold of steel processing), to increase duties on Chinese aluminum and steel from 8 to 25 percent. This would be – ISPI underlines – an even more protectionist change for a president who during his first term did not change his strategy at all compared to Trump, actually multiplying his efforts to limit Chinese technological development as much as possible with other means. It is no coincidence that Biden has imposed on average more than 100 restrictions per year on exports to China. More than Trump, and almost 10 times more than Obama did before him.
The only safe (and decidedly dirty) weapon in Beijing’s hands is fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opioid that has become the leading cause of death among Americans aged 18 to 49. At the November meeting in Woodside, Xi agreed to take action to stem the flow of precursors and equipment used in producing the painkiller in Latin America. Blinken will push for more, in the form of disrupting industry funding networks and more consistent enforcement actions. It is not clear whether Beijing will limit cooperation on an issue so vital to Washington, but it is clear that if it were to do so, all the progress made so far in Sino-American relations would quickly be reversed.
