I grew up in a world – the first Cold War – where the term “Finlandization” was used. Not at family dinners… but in newspapers and in foreign policy debates. Finland was a reality and a metaphor at the same time. This vast but depopulated Nordic country had distinguished itself in a heroic war of resistance against Stalin and had managed to save its independence against a much larger Soviet army. On 30 November 1939, after having “divided” Poland with Hitler on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the communist dictator launched the Red Army to conquer Finland. In three months of fighting the Soviet forces failed to tame a much smaller Finnish army, and Stalin had to give up. Later, to avoid being swallowed up by the Russian bear, the Finns supported Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa, when the latter tore up the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and turned against his ally.
Finland’s choice: to become neutral
After the Second World War, and having experienced first-hand the aggressiveness of his neighbour, Finland had drawn a geopolitical consequence from this: it was better to become neutral so as not to excite Moscow’s appetites. Like Austria, another border nation between East and West, Finland had accepted a destiny of limited sovereignty throughout the Cold War. Neutral between the two blocs – and often hostess for important US-USSR summits in Helsinki – she had been able to opt for the Western model in every other sphere: democracy, freedom of expression, rule of law, market economy.
“Finlandization” had become a term that statesmen and experts handled with respect, admiration, apprehension or fear. In the seventieswhen the USSR attempted to brutally alter the strategic balance by deploying its SS-20 missiles with nuclear warheads against Western Europe, there was fear that the American nuclear umbrella would lose its value. A part of the pacifist movement openly called for the “Finlandization” of the whole of Europe.
The 80s
I remember the frequency of use of that term in the 1980s, when I was a correspondent in Paris. The communist bloc in the East was creaking under the weight of an economic and ethical disaster; German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand were negotiating the future structures of Europe with Washington and Moscow. Often traveling between Paris, Brussels and Bonn (then the federal capital), I met many German and French geopolitical experts who wondered about the scenario of a “Finlandized” Germany as a condition for its reunification.
Meanwhile, Finland, the real one, was slowly moving closer to NATO. Without making a fuss, without sensational tears. Just like neighboring Sweden, she was becoming convinced that neutrality was a nice thing to proclaim to appease the Soviet Union, but in reality it made no sense. If neutrality means equidistance, it does not suit Helsinki (nor Stockholm). It is not geographically equidistant between a distant America and a too-close Russia. It is not equidistant as a value system: Finland is a land of freedom and respect for human rights. It is not equidistant in terms of strategic risk: the only potential aggressor is its eastern neighbor, there are no other dangers on the horizon. So under the guise of “Finlandisation”, for years Helsinki has already accustomed its armed forces to consulting with those of NATO, to collaborating and coordinating.
The invasion of Ukraine and Finnish membership in NATO
Then came the tragedy of February 2022, the invasion of Ukraine, which precipitated matters. The Russian risk is no longer a hypothesis, it has become a very concrete and immanent reality for those who live in Helsinki. Politicians and the population decided in unison: goodbye “Finlandization”, it was time to dissolve any residual ambiguity, join NATOto effectively enter into a defensive alliance against the only danger from which the Finns must defend themselves.
Today, as I write, Finland is hosting NATO exercises. Following the accession of Helsinki, the Russian-Finnish border became the longest land border between the Atlantic alliance and Russia: 1,330 kilometres. At the time of “Finlandization” the two hot East-West borders were located in Germany and Turkey, today the center of gravity has moved much further north. Finland quickly adjusted its military spending to reach 2% of GDP, a minimum target agreed between Member States since Barack Obama’s time (but still disregarded by many, including Italy). Finnish government, media and NGOs denounce an escalation of hostile acts by Putin: from cyberattacks to flows of illegal migrants. The new Finnish president, Alexander Stubb, has expressed willingness to authorize the deployment of nuclear weapons on his territory, overcoming an ancient ban.
What remains of Finnishization today?
“Finlandization” in its original meaning is a thing of the past, Putin’s behavior has forced his neighbor to take action. There remain neutral countries in Europe, starting with Switzerland and Austria which, like us, are part of the democratic and capitalist West: however, neither of these two shares a border with Russiathe fear of Moscow’s expansionism does not concern them in such a direct and current way.
In the in the pacifist world, the mentality has not changed compared to the seventies and eighties: Many aspire, openly or implicitly, to a divorce from America. So long as today “Finnishing” would mean opening our eyes and raising the level of defensewill the alternative option have to be renamed: “Swiss” or “Austro-Hungarian”?
