Israel knew about the Hamas attack in advance

Israel knew in advance aboutHamas attack of October 7th. Reporting the news is Kanthe public broadcaster of the Jewish State, which would have had the opportunity to consult ainformation from Unit 8200, the elite interception unit of military intelligence specialized in signals intelligencewhich on September 19th would have discovered that Hamas was preparing an intrusion operation in the territory of Israel and practiced hostage-taking.

“The document described a series of exercises that the Palestinian terrorist group’s elite forces were carrying out, including drills for raids on Israeli cities and military positions, and training on how to hold soldiers and civilians hostage inside Gaza and under what circumstances they could have been killed,” commented the Times of Israel.

The document potentially casts a shadow on the official version of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, according to which no one in Tel Aviv foresaw the extent of theOperation Al-Aqsa Flood, which resulted in the intrusion of 3 thousand jihadists into over thirty breaches, the killing of 1,200 people and the capture of over 200 hostages. Which was followed by very harsh Israeli reaction on Gazaa war that it has already caused almost 40 thousand deathsoverwhelmingly civilians, without achieve significant strategic results for Israel. If not to consolidate the limping Netanyahu government, which seemed to be at the end of the line after the country’s split over justice in 2023.

The intelligence information, the political-military hole, the predicted scenario that occurs: everything conspires to make the accusations clear that many of Netanyahu’s critics were already addressing him at the beginning of the war. Those, that is, of having neglected Hamas in the scale of the threat hierarchies, of having bent security to ideology by sending the army to protect the settlers in the West Bank when it was needed to guard the borders of Gaza, of having in a certain sense favored the growth of radicals close to the Muslim Brotherhood to operate a divide et impera in Palestine. At the beginning of the Gaza conflict we wrote in these columns that Netanyahu had had the “his war“ necessary to consolidate itself in power. A document alone does not make history or strategybut it is clear that the Israeli government played with fire not encouraging the attention of theintelligence on security threats more cogent.

Lost in its anti-Iranian crusade and the challenge with Hezbollah, focused on the colonization push in the West Bank and forgetful of Gaza, the Israeli leadership has left to happen with tragic carelessness the events of October 7th. Taking the opportunity for a broader military strategy that seems to have nothing to do with with the reparation of the wrong and the losses of the Hamas attacks. If these documents were followed by others, the idea of ​​the simple would disappear intelligence failure and it would pave the way for an even broader political failure in the Netanyahu government’s forecasting of crisis scenarios. “Mr. Security” becomes the primary actor of the Israeli chaos, and the fact that the news not received by the government would arrive from Unit 8200 of the Aman can justify the resignation, which occurred in April, of Aharon Halivadirector ofIsraeli military intelligence. Who assumed his responsibilities where the blame for a massacre that cost Israel a massacre and was taken as a pretext for the Gaza slaughterhouse perhaps lies to be traced back to a policy that was unable, or willing, to listen. Lost in the prejudice of the inviolability of Israel which tragically disappeared on 7 October.