For this round, it should be over. The risk of a direct confrontation between Israel and Iran has drastically reduced after reaching its peak. On the night between April 18 and 19, Israel responded to the Iranian attack on April 13, which in turn was a reaction to the Israeli attack on April 1 against the Iranian consulate in Damascus. It seems there won’t be an answer to the answer to the answer. In fact, Israel, under US pressure, has chosen to return to the phantom war, with unclaimed attacks that aim to send a message while avoiding provoking a wider conflict. Were they drones, as the Iranians claim, or missiles? Where were they launched from? Was the target, probably a military base in the Isfahan region, hit? It will be important to clarify these elements.
What we do know, however, is that Israeli officials preferred to remain silent and their Iranian colleagues did everything they could to downplay the extent of the facts. The two countries saved face: Israel demonstrated that it was capable of striking Iranian territory without Washington’s help, Iran was able to claim once again that its deterrence had been re-established. On both sides the watchword is now de-escalation.
Israel could not wage war with Iran without the United States, at least until it has a White House devoted to the cause on its side
The specter of war, however, has not disappeared. Israel had promised to respond more decisively. Several reasons could explain why the Jewish state ultimately did not do so: the United States did not want to be involved in a full-scale conflict against Iran; the Iranian attack allowed Israel to emerge from diplomatic isolation; Washington has imposed new sanctions on the Islamic Republic; and, above all, the Jewish state has other priorities. Top of the list: Rafah. In second place: Hezbollah. Iran is only in third position.
The Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu wants to continue operations in Gaza. He wants to defeat Hamas, free the hostages and push part of the enclave’s population towards Egypt. But he wants to do it without conflict with his US ally. The fact that he “gave in” on the reaction to Iran could offer him greater room for maneuver in this sense.
From the Israeli perspective, Hezbollah represents the main security threat today. Iran is more than a thousand kilometers away and is not (yet) a nuclear power. Even if it was contained after October 7, the Lebanese Shiite party has 150 thousand missiles piled up a few tens of kilometers from the Jewish state and is the Iranian instrument capable of causing the most damage to Tel Aviv.
Israel could not start a full-scale war with Iran without the United States, at least until it has a White House devoted to the cause on its side: which could happen within a few months, in the event of Donald’s victory Trump. However, regardless of who is in Washington, Israel will not tolerate such a strong Hezbollah, much less a nuclear-armed Iran.
If an agreement is not reached in the coming months that provides for a buffer zone on the border between Lebanon and Israel, from which the Shiite militia should withdraw, war seems inevitable. The longer the agreement is delayed, the more the risk of a large Israeli operation in Lebanon will increase. However, Hezbollah will not agree to open negotiations until the war in Gaza is over, betting on the fact that even then Hamas will not have been eliminated from the enclave. This front will remain warm, at least for a few weeks.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic is getting closer to the atomic bomb every day. Are Iranian leaders ready to take this step? It is currently unclear. Becoming a nuclear power also carries risks. However, this would allow the regime to ensure its survival and give its allies in the region even greater room for maneuver.
Israel will do everything it can to avoid this scenario, even at the risk of conflict with the Islamic Republic.
It seems that the trajectories of these two powers are destined to collide. Yet, conflict can be avoided. However, it would be necessary to reach an agreement between Israel and Hezbollah and resurrect the Iranian nuclear agreement, which Trump had torn up. At a minimum, this would presuppose an interim agreement between the United States and Iran, or conversely a renewed US commitment to limit the Islamic Republic’s influence in the Middle East. All this implies, finally, that Israel agrees to make concessions on the Palestinian issue to obtain a true alliance with the Arab countries against Iran. But in today’s Middle East all this really seems like a chimera. ◆ fdl
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