The readers of Globalist they learned, in these tragic months of war, to understand the thoughts of Ehud Olmert.
Olmert is a centre-right politician. A decent politician. Among the historic leaders of the Likud, the antipodes of the one who over the years transformed the party that once belonged to Shamir, Sharon, Rivlin, Olmert himself, into his own fiefdom: Benjamin Netanyahu.
Ehud Olmert was prime minister during the war. In the second war in Lebanon. He has made serious decisions, but he has never gone so far as to pursue and continue a war for his own personal gain. War as insurance for one’s political life.
Stop the war
Olmert writes about Haaretz: “After more than six months of hybrid warfare – in the air, on the ground and underground – it is possible to conclude that the bulk of Hamas’ military power has been dismantled. Most of its rockets and launch sites have been destroyed, and there have been virtually no rocket launches from the Gaza Strip for more than four months.
This is not the result of a tactical decision by Hamas to deceive and disarm the Israeli security forces, and then surprise us again with an unexpected attack that could seriously damage the home front and our combat units. It is very likely that Hamas has almost no rockets or launch sites left and is unable to operate the few it does have, given that the army controls most of the areas from which rockets could be fired at Israel.
A considerable part of Hamas fighters was killed, a very significant result. These are not only front-line fighters, but also members of its command level. It is almost certain that the senior commanders, especially Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, are still alive. They hide in places whose penetration could make Israel pay a very high price, which it would be wrong to pay.
It will be possible to target Sinwar and Deif in future targeted actions, although this takes time and does not necessarily fit into the prime minister’s personal timetable. For him, the killing of Hamas commanders is an opportunity to stage a victory gala that obscures the scale of the failure for which he is responsible: the October 7 disaster.
However, as has been said several times, the course of the war and its priorities must not be subordinated to Netanyahu’s personal needs. There is no one in Israel who does not want Deif and Sinwar killed. They are cold-blooded killers who have no moral inhibitions, terrorists in the fullest sense of the word. As much as we want to eliminate them, we must act with moderation, patience and reason.
During the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was designated as a target. We wanted to cut off the head of that poisonous snake, but we did not subordinate the war to this cause alone. Ultimately, Nasrallah said on Lebanese television that if he had known what 1% would have been the extent of Israel’s response to the kidnapping and killing of Ehud Goldwasser, Eldad Regev and other soldiers, and of Israel’s ferocious response to the Hezbollah missile attack, it would not.
For an Israeli soldier, such a statement from a living Nasrallah was almost equivalent to killing him and showing his body. The 17 years in which he refrained from initiating a single attack against Israel – not even with small arms – are a profound reflection of the military outcome of that 2006 war and the deterrence he created on the northern border. While some of us still enjoy criticizing his successes after all these years, the fact that Nasrallah realizes the extent of his defeat is enough to put that war into perspective.
At this point, we have achieved the same level of deterrence in Gaza that we had at the end of the Second Lebanon War. At the start of the ground maneuver in Gaza, the prime minister had set an unrealistic goal, which there was no way to achieve or measure. Benjamin Netanyahu did this, in my opinion, for vile conspiratorial reasons that cannot be hidden. He knew that talking about “total victory” over Hamas was an empty slogan. There will be no such victory. If not, he can always blame the military for not getting it.
In reality, we witnessed a genuine, impressive and unprecedented victory. Never has a conventional army been forced to fight a terrorist organization that hides almost entirely in a network of underground tunnels tens of meters deep, located in dense urban centers that are home to hundreds of thousands of uninvolved civilians. These civilians were placed, against their will, at the center of Israeli military activity and, inevitably, were exposed to air strikes and fire from commando units pursuing the terrorist leaders, becoming tragic victims of the war.
In this complex situation and under the critical eyes of the international community – including those of our most committed friends and supporters – the Israel Defense Forces have performed admirably. There is no military campaign so complicated that it is conducted without errors, without unnecessary friendly fire and without shootings at uninvolved civilians.
There have been some worrying displays of trigger joy, the victims of which have been some of our hostages and Gazan civilians who have been captured in combat zones and paid with their lives. Few could deny that in many cases our soldiers were needlessly reckless. But it is difficult to blame them, considering the very particular nature of these fights, which take place in the total confusion of fighting inside residential neighborhoods and above Hamas’ death tunnels.
However, there is one goal we have not yet achieved: the release of the hostages. This objective has not been a focus of Netanyahu’s attention from the beginning and has apparently thwarted several opportunities to broaden the negotiated understandings between Israel and Hamas and move forward with a comprehensive agreement that would free all the hostages. Rafah is not a crucial target that could decide the outcome of the fighting between Israel and Hamas.
Although it is emotionally difficult, almost impossible to accept, it is important to understand that Israel will not emerge victorious from this confrontation. Boastful talk of “total victory” reflects stupidity, arrogance, and, above all, an effort to create distance from an image of non-victory and avoid the inevitable public judgment that is likely to follow.
Netanyahu has long stopped thinking about what is best for Israel, its future and its strategic interests. It has been a long time since he considered the inevitable obligation to start limiting the damage of the hard blow we have suffered and to lay the foundations for restoring the country, the armed forces, the security forces and, above all, the society Israeli, whose solidarity was once the secret of its strength.
Netanyahu lives in a bubble cut off from reality. Inside the bubble, he tells himself and others that he is fighting for Israel’s existence, that an immediate risk is threatening him, and that his historic mission is to face the entire world and defend Israel. by those who want to destroy it.
Netanyahu’s behavior leaves no other conclusion than that, in his opinion, many of his opponents knowingly and deliberately seek the destruction of Israel. I assume that those in the emotionally impenetrable human tunnel in which he is trapped (along with his family and some supporters) believe that most of Israel’s friends around the world, especially US President Joe Biden and perhaps some European leaders, may bring about the destruction of Israel due to pressure exerted by leftists and Israel-haters from within and by their allies elsewhere.
In this regard, it seems that in Netanyahu’s worldview the country’s greatest enemies are the bravest and most daring Israeli soldiers and members of the opposition elected to the Knesset. I am referring to Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, whose decency and devotion to Israel is exploited by Netanyahu who, deep down, despises them and sees them as enemies and rivals.
We have reached the decisive stage: Are we heading towards a hostage rescue agreement or are we racing at breakneck speed towards an accident on the outskirts of Rafah?
The capture of Rafah has no strategic significance regarding Israel’s vital interests. Netanyahu knows this well, as do some senior military officers and retired officials. Destroying four more Hamas battalions may have been the right move if it had been disconnected from the broader context of events. But such a maneuver would take months and result in many casualties among our soldiers, kill thousands of uninvolved Palestinians and destroy what remains of Israel’s international reputation.
It would intensify demonstrations on campuses across America and the world and lead to the issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli leaders and soldiers. Above all, it would put the hostages in immediate danger. Such a move would represent criminal recklessness on the part of a group of people, led by Netanyahu, who are ready to destroy the foundations of our existence just to continue to hold on to power.
Some of the decisions I made when I was head of the Israeli government were heavily criticized. Toward its conclusion, the Second Lebanon War was the source of relentless attacks on me and members of my cabinet, as well as on the military commanders who led the campaign. It does not matter at all that, in retrospect, most critics realize that it was a successful war – although not without failures and mistakes – with several strategic outcomes, which have become clearer after many years. However, none of those who opposed the war at the time ever thought to argue that the government was motivated by the personal interests of its leader.
The vast majority of Israelis agree that the sole motivation for the expanded military campaign and invasion of Rafah is not what is right for Israel, but is part of a planned decision to sacrifice the lives of hostages to preserve the political life of the man who continues to push Israel towards the abyss.
It’s time to stop Netanyahu and the government of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. It’s time to flood the streets with millions of resolute opponents to surround the group of outlaws who are leading Israel to collapse and stop them, before it’s too late,” concludes Olmert.
Before it’s too late. But that “late” knocks on the doors. And maybe he’s already in.
