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Last October 4, Il Sole 24 Ore published a Manifesto for Europe promoted by the undersigned and signed by eminent personalities from 15 countries. The central thesis of the Manifesto is that the production model of the European Union (EU) is unsustainable so much so that, if it were not changed, the area would fall into long stagnation, would not be able to maintain its social model and would have a marginal role in the scenario world. Among the paths not to follow, the Manifesto indicates climate denialism, the temptations of “fortress Europe”, neo-mercantilism. Instead, it puts forward seven recommendations intended to lead to a “gradual and pragmatic” federalism.
These are: consolidating the single market and overcoming the national state aid regime; reform the EU budget to make room for the provision of European Public Goods (BPE); launch a community industrial policy; incentivize innovative investments and guarantee the sustainability of public debts thanks to effective fiscal rules; complete the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union; build a single defense and security policy; define a strategy for the economic and social inclusion of migrants.
In the past six months, the Manifesto has fueled a significant debate which has confirmed the validity of the initial diagnosis and has allowed us to delve deeper into the policy proposals. Unfortunately, disregarding the hopes of the signatories, in Italy and beyond these proposals were practically ignored by the campaign for the European elections. Yet, new dramatic conflicts have led to a further deterioration of the geo-political framework; Furthermore, economic concerns have increased. This has made the need to translate the seven recommendations mentioned above into concrete initiatives even more pressing.
At an economic level, those trade-offs that influenced the pre-pandemic phases are re-emerging. Given the decline in excess inflation, macroeconomic stagnation calls for easing of monetary policy and a more active role for fiscal policies. However, the progressive worsening of imbalances in public deficits and debts of most member states makes this response at a national level impossible. Furthermore, no EU country reaches the minimum size for national initiatives that do not end in defensive choices. After the hopes generated by the approval of Next Generation–EU, a climate of mistrust has returned which prevents the emergence of the potentially most effective solution: the creation of a permanent fiscal capacity for the production of BPE. Such a solution would generate two further positive effects: the new fiscal rules, in the process of definitive approval, could more easily achieve a combination between national budget adjustments and support for centralized investments, thus weakening recessionary risks; the construction sites of the banking union and capital markets could be reopened, essential for the mobilization of private financial wealth to support the double transaction, green and digital.
At an institutional level, there is a worrying tendency to favor the false options denounced by the Manifesto. Not only are the implementation times of the green transition at risk, with the effect of increasing its total cost even if spread over a longer period of time, but the essential strategic objectives themselves. There are also shadows emerging on the albeit positive awareness that the BPEs, relating to the common defense policy, are of crucial importance. In this regard, the divergences between Member States regarding the objectives are intertwined with an over-simplification of the open problems (for example, how to build an integrated defense industry) and of the effort required in terms of common resources.
