Because the USA tries to avoid the comparison between the Russian S-400 and the F-35 fighter and who would win in the comparison

In a recent article, the Washington Post praised Russian weapons that could potentially be sold to Iran, reserving a place of favor for the S-400 anti-aircraft system and stating that this could identify all the aircraft used by Israel, including the F-35 stealth fighter . The system is so feared that US experts believe that the know-how passed on to the Iranians alone could put US air capacity at risk.

Is the US hesitant to deploy the F-35 near the S-400?

While the possibility of a confrontation between these two formidable weapons systems may seem remote, concerns regarding their coexistence are very real.

The crux of the matter lies in the fear that the S-400 could compromise the sensitive technology and operational capabilities of the F-35. The diplomatic fallout from NATO member Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 is a poignant example of the tensions surrounding the issue.

The dispute between Turkey and the United States over the purchase of the S-400 in 2019 led to Ankara’s expulsion from the F-35 program, effectively blocking all training and delivery processes related to the fighter jets. This rift highlights the seriousness with which the United States views the potential risks associated with the co-location of the F-35 and S-400.

Kathryn Wheelbarger, then the acting US Assistant Secretary of Defense, summed up this concern succinctly when she openly acknowledged that the S-400 was designed specifically to target and neutralize aircraft such as the F-35.

In his words, it is “It is inconceivable to imagine that Russia does not exploit this intelligence gathering opportunity“.

This sentiment was also echoed by Gen. Tod Wolters, who led the US European Command, pointing out the fundamental incompatibility between the F-35 and the S-400.

He highlighted the inability of these systems to communicate with each other and highlighted the risks posed by the S-400’s attempts to exploit the F-35’s capabilities. The prospect of sharing radar and critical operational data with Russia is a scenario the United States and its allies are determined to avoid at all costs.

Despite the low probability of confrontation between these two military assets, the mere presence of the S-400 in the regions where the F-35 operates represents a complex and multifaceted challenge.

Defense experts suggest that the presence of the S-400 near the F-35 could increase Russia’s ability to improve radar detection of American aircraft. Additionally, with greater access to F-35 data, S-400 owners and operators could more effectively identify the aircraft’s vulnerabilities.

The S-400 system uses two to three radars alternately. If a system is unable to provide an accurate track of an aircraft, the system can activate another radar, or the type of radar required for an intercept can be defined ex ante. Having information on the vehicles means accelerating and improving the identification process by the battery. This is why the USA does not want this dangerous mix.

Can the S-400 really detect stealth jets?

The roots of the S-400’s technological prowess can be traced back to its predecessor, the S-300 system. Although the S-400 shares much of its hardware with the S-300, significant upgrades have been made to radar systems, software, and missile types. These improvements give the S-400 greater flexibility in target interception and range extension capabilities.

The heart of the S-400’s anti-stealth capabilities is the Nebo-M radar system, which comprises three distinct antennas (arrays) operating on different frequency bands.

By taking advantage of low-frequency radar arrays, such as the Nebo SVU (VHF band) and the Protivnik G (L band), the Nebo-M system is able to detect the presence of stealth fighters when they approach. While these low-frequency arrays do not provide the image fidelity needed for pointing, they play a crucial role in initial detection and tracking.

To complement the capabilities of the low-frequency arrays, the Nebo-M system integrates Russia’s Gamma S1 array that operates in the S and X bands. By networking these arrays, the Nebo-M system offers a comprehensive, layered approach to detection and stealth aircraft tracking.

It is important to understand the inherent limitations of stealth technology when evaluating the effectiveness of the S-400’s counteraction capabilities.

Although modern stealth fighters are designed to minimize detection against high-frequency radar bands, they are not entirely immune to detection. The size of their radar cross section (RCS) determines their detectability, with smaller RCS values ​​indicating reduced visibility to radars.

F 35

For example, the F-35 boasts an RCS of approximately 0.0015 square meters, while the F-22’s RCS is even smaller, ranging from 0.0001 to 0.0002 square meters. Despite these advances in stealth technology, no modern fighter is capable of completely evading detection against low-frequency radar bands. However, even if minimal, there is some radar reflection.

A peer-reviewed assessment by Hellenic Air Force Colonel and electrical engineer Konstantinos Zikidis sheds light on the capabilities of the Nebo-M system.

According to NATO experts, the low-frequency arrays employed by the Nebo-M can detect the F-117 Nighthawk at distances of up to 350 kilometers in optimal conditions and potentially up to 72 kilometers in strong jamming conditions.

However, it is essential to distinguish between detection and pointing. While the S-400’s stealth claims are based on its detection capabilities, successfully targeting a stealth aircraft remains a complex and challenging task.

In practical terms, stealth technology aims to delay detection long enough to allow the aircraft to engage the enemy or evade the threat. The effectiveness of stealth technology depends on several factors, including the distance between the aircraft and the radar field.

S-400 vs F-35: Who would win?

Data provided by Hellenic Air Force Colonel Zikidis, who has studied the performance of the S-400 and is familiar with NATO stealth fighters, illustrates the detection range of the S-400 system’s low-frequency radars against the F-117.

Given that the radar cross section of the F-117 is approximately 30 times larger than that of the F-22 and at least double that of the F-35, the detection and targeting range of these advanced fighters will be significantly reduced.

According to past estimates, S-400 radar systems could spot an F-35 when it approaches within about 20 miles, 30 km. However, the F-35 is armed with air-to-ground missiles capable of reaching targets up to 40-60 miles, i.e. 60-90 km, away.

Launching from a distance well beyond the S-400’s 20-mile detection range, the F-35 missile has a strong chance of hitting its target without risking the aircraft. However, the reality is much more complex, especially when considering the integration of the S-400 into a larger integrated air defense system (IADS). Furthermore, as the shooting down of the F.117 in Serbia in 1999 shows, a theoretically ineffective system can still score a good hit.

S-400 anti-aircraft missile (SAM) systems.

In reality, the possible superiority of the F-35 depends on a series of factors that go far beyond the challenge between a single fighter and a single anti-aircraft battery. Miltos Antoniades, a former Hellenic Air Force specialist, stressed that penetrating such sophisticated networks is no easy feat. Antoniades highlighted various scenarios that complicate the task of stealth fighters to penetrate integrated air defense networks.

A “nap-of-the-earth” approach (a method employed by military aircraft that involves flying at extremely low altitudes, with the aim of evading enemy detection and attacks in a high-risk environment) could evade detection by the S-400 radar, but expose the aircraft to other threats, such as point defense systems such as the Tor M1.

Alternatively, flying at medium altitudes could trigger responses from other elements of the air defense network, such as fighter jets on air patrol (CAP), forcing stealth aircraft to deviate from their flight path or risk exposure.

Furthermore, the presence of airborne radar or anti-aircraft systems on board ships adds another level of complexity. The more sophisticated the air defense network, the more difficult it becomes for stealth fighters to penetrate and engage high-value targets like the S-400.

Even if a stealth fighter manages to approach undetected and launch its weapons, the S-400 crew is likely to detect the launch and take defensive measures.

Potential responses include turning off radar, firing salvos at the threat, or employing decoy tactics. The effectiveness of these countermeasures has yet to be determined and can only be demonstrated in real combat situations.

Likewise, the power of stealth fighters to penetrate integrated air defense systems and neutralize high-value targets like the S-400 depends on continuous assessment, adaptation of tactics, and the dynamic nature of warfare.

So the problem is very complex. The S-400 system and probably also the S-300 can detect F-35 and maybe even the F-22 fighter, but this does not mean that the data is sufficient to define a precise enough launch resolution. Furthermore, a stealth fighter is not just a passive element, but can actively defend itself from anti-aircraft batteries.

This type of fighter can, indeed often is, equipped with HARM missiles, specific against anti-aircraft radars, such as the AGM88 HAMR.

AGM88E HARM

This type of medium-altitude missile has a range of 80 km at medium altitude, which is doubled for the latest G ER model. This means that the challenge between anti-aircraft battery and fighter is much more complicated and truly difficult to predict.