No country in the euro area would gain as much as Italy from a possible decision to issue common European debt. Yet, our parties seem determined to do everything to strengthen the reluctance of those governments that do not want the common debt. If Italy resists any commitment regarding public finances, why should others trust us?
Until the autumn the government does not intend to tell us how it will fill the gap – 19-20 billion euros – between the promises it has already made for next year and the money it will have in hand to fulfill them. A few days ago the Minister of Economy had to work to block an electoral gift promoted by his deputy, tax relief on thirteenth wages to be financed with entirely hypothetical proceeds.
So far, the fairly prudent choices of Giorgia Meloni and Giancarlo Giorgetti are maintaining the government’s relative goodwill from the financial markets. But in the other capitals governments are wondering what is the guarantee that Italy can be trusted in the future, when practically all the parties, majority and opposition, express disapproval of the new European rules for budgets which in other countries are very little controversial. The fragility of our politics, in which both sides drift towards exasperated positions because each party fears being overtaken in demagoguery by its allies, does not put Italy in a good light. Yet, Europe is proving generous to us, given that so far it has already paid us 102.4 billion of the Pnrr: collected collectively, it should be remembered, by all the member states. Greater mutual trust would be necessary today, more than ever. The plans to react to this difficult phase of history are being clarified, in the almost ready report by Mario Draghi, in the already known one by Enrico Letta, and finally in the very detailed speech of the French president Emmanuel Macron the day before yesterday at the Sorbonne, which in Germany forces important ones encourage the Berlin government to make its own. The difficulties in implementing these essentially similar plans are enormous. There is the political weakness of Macron himself in France, where his party is doing badly in the pre-election polls, there is the impotence of the German government divided by serious disagreements over the policies to be implemented. But for our part we must be aware that a heavy obstacle, which is difficult to remove, is posed by Italy itself, all of it. There is also a difficulty in governing public finances in France, to a lesser extent.
Even there, deficit spending seems to the parties to be an instrument of consensus which cannot be renounced; and Macron himself, fearful of a bad result in the European vote, wanted to avoid an adjustment. It matters little that in the countries that have managed to contain themselves, such as Portugal, no catastrophe has occurred. Everywhere there is a lack of political courage. The very country that prides itself on economic excellence, Germany, has seen its growth stop because it is unable to remedy the contradictions that politically paralyze it, and because powerful economic interests do not like the “epochal turning point” inspired by the fear of Russia.
Only perhaps from defense needs can there be a stimulus to pool European resources beyond what was done with the Pnrr, and which Germany does not want to repeat. France is banking on it because it knows that it could exercise leadership there, but it too is hesitant to draw all the necessary conclusions. It will be interesting to see how much and exactly how Draghi will focus on this topic.
