There is a historical truth, precise and irrefutable, about massacres from the tension strategy. It’s just not easy to grasp. We must start again from the individual facts, those that have been verified with evidence, documents, testimonies, even, in rare cases, confessions. We must read the sentences, all of them, up to the final verdicts. AND isolate the facts which are proven at all levels of judgement. The undeniable truths. That there are. I am there for the massacre of Fountain Square of 1969, for Loggia Square from 1974 (in the picture)For Petean of 1972, for Bologna of 1980. There are a myriad of other attacks, of varying severity, from those years. They are also there for the mafia massacres of 1992-1993.
This is the precious work he does Paolo Biondanijudicial journalist ofExpressedin the book “The girl from Gladio and other black stories: the hidden plot of all the massacres”published by Fuori Scena, with a preface by Benedetta Tobagi. Sifting through tens of thousands of pages of procedural documents, Biondani leaves suggestions and hypotheses aside, to isolate elements of truth that can no longer be denied. And which, put together, give a unique interpretation of what the strategy of tension was.
For example, on the 8 dead and 102 injured from the bomb that exploded in Piazza della Loggia a Bresciaat an anti-fascist demonstration on May 28, 1974, there is even an autograph signature, that of Ermanno Buzzineo-fascist from Brescia tattooed with the writing “SS“. He wrote the typewriter of the two claim leaflets (the strategy of blaming the “reds” was now discredited). His signature remained on one of these leaflets, probably because the neo-fascist had carelessly initialed a piece of paper placed over the claim. Sentenced to life imprisonment in the first instance, probably determined to make some admissions, he will end up massacred by black terrorists Mario Tuti And Pierluigi Concutelli in Novara prison, 48 hours after a transfer that he had desperately tried to avoid. The final verdict for him is given directly by his comrades.
The truth about the massacres is also tiring because it is often difficult to ascertain individual facts broken up into different investigations, so the litmus test can emerge many years after the conclusion of the trials. The mass of evidence accumulated against right-wing extremists applies to everyone Franco Freda And Giovanni Ventura only after their definitive acquittal for the Piazza Fontana massacre. The same rule also applies to Brescia. They are the magistrates investigating the train massacre Italicus (4 August 1974, 16 dead and 267 injured) to be able to ascertain only in the 1980s that the Sid, the military secret service, had an informant among the Venetian neo-fascists. Who, between 1973 and 1974, spied on meetings and reported massacre plans while the bomb in Piazza della Loggia was being prepared. But instead of intervening, Biondani writes, the services “let the attacks happen”.
If today, by pure fictional judicial hypothesis, a trial were opened on the complicity of high officials of our secret services, but also of policemen and carabinieri and men of the Armed Forces, the evidence would be massive. In Peteano, for example, there were three carabinieri sidetrack the investigation to try to save the authors of the massacre, neo-fascists of New order, despite the victims being their comrades, killed at random with a car bomb (3 dead and 2 injured). A marshal will confess to the falsification of the reports, and the trial for the misdirections will end with the definitive convictions of two superiors, a colonel and a general. One of the perpetrators of the massacre, Carlo Cicuttiniwas secretary of the section ofMSI in his town in the province of Gorizia.
For many years we called them “Italian mysteries“, and in fact there is still quite a bit to discover. But some episodes of the strategy of tension were so blatant and false that they seemed like the script for grotesque films about “colonels”, popular in those years. The Century of Italythen an organ of the MSI and today of Brothers of Italywrote that those responsible for throwing hand grenades that cost the police officer his life Antonio Marino, during an MSI demonstration on 12 April 1973 in Milan, they lost their “PCI cards” on the street. Communists infiltrated among the MSI. But look at this. Those who threw the bombs, however, were two well-known “Sanbabilini” thugs, identified also thanks to the collaboration of a leader of Almirante’s party, who only from this moment began to distance himself from the Nazi-fascists who planted the bombs. Comrades who make mistakes.
Another tragic rubbish, the cry “Long live Pinelli! Long live anarchy!” launched by Gianfranco Bertoli, stopped immediately after throwing the bomb at the Milan Police Headquarters (17 May 1973, 4 dead and 52 injured). Instead Bertoli is a neo-fascist, he frequents the Ordine Nuovo tours Venetois on the Gladio lists and is also an informer on the payroll of Sifar and then of the Sid. Another documented fact: the Sid center in Padua destroyed all the documentation in its possession on Bertoli three years after the latter had confessed to the massacre.
TO Gladioor more likely to a subgroup of it, to an even more secret structure determined to fight the Italian left without waiting for a possible Soviet invasion, carry many threads of the stories told in the book. Including the sequel to clandestine arsenals of weapons of war and explosives attributable to men in uniform and black extremists, to which Biondani dedicates an original in-depth analysis. By the way, who is the Gladio girl who gives the book its title? Today she is a wealthy lady, but in those years she was the protagonist of a case that emerged only recently in yet another proceeding still open in Piazza della Loggia.
In 1974 she was 17 years old, declared herself an ardent fascist like her 21 year old boyfriend, Silvio Ferrari. Who died in Brescia, torn apart by a bomb that he himself was carrying, nine days before the massacre. To the magistrates, fifty years later, he is telling a disconcerting story, which will have to be examined in court, but is already supported by non-trivial objective evidence. Still minors, she and her boyfriend would have participated in secret meetings in a barracks, in the presence of some soldiers and a few selected black terrorists, all very young, coordinated with a decisive attitude by Francesco Delfinothe senior intelligence and carabinieri officer who died in 2014, after being involved in a thousand plots.
Facts separated from opinions, of course, but only verified and proven ones, is Biondani’s method. But his book is not a flattened book on the so-called judicial truths: instead it shows how numerous there are controversial sentences to say the least on the strategy of tension. An exemplary case is the verdict of Court of Appeal of Rome who in 1984 was acquitted, canceling the first degree conviction, Amos Spiazzithe colonel of the internal army intelligence serviceswho was arrested as the organizer of the paramilitary group The wind rose. Among other things, he kept a homemade arsenal of around thirty machine guns, rifles and military pistols. From “collector“, he defended himself. Even from that acquittal sentence it emerges that, after his arrest, Spiazzi had confessed to having been part of a secret structure that organized illegal anti-communist activities. Biondani writes: “It takes truly exceptional judges to acquit someone who has confessed.”
