In a normal country, if the last two defense ministers had been removed for corruption and betrayaldark, coup-like scenarios would open up. In Chinese instead, the torpedoing of the leaders of thePeople’s Army of liberation has become normal. In 2017 the Xinhua wrote: «Since 2012, under the leadership of Comrade Xi, over 100 senior officers were arrested: a higher number than the generals who died on the battlefield during the revolutionary wars.” Since then the list of those “shot” (metaphorically speaking) has grown.
Thursday 27 June Beijing Politburo announced that the generals Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were expelled from Communist Partydegraded, placed in the hands of military magistrates: thus the careers of the two ended in disgrace former ministers who had been at the top of the Defense for the last six years. Which coincide with the times of maximum effort Xi Jinping to reform the armed forces and prepare them “to fight a war and win it”: his words, repeated obsessively.
Wei Fenghe70 years old, had been in office from 2018 to 2023, when he officially left the scene due to voluntary resignation. In his place he had been promoted Li Shangfu66 years old, who however passed away in August 2023, after having been in office for only seven months. No official statement then, only speculations that spoke of involvement in a major corruption investigation which has caused many heads to roll in the Chinese military hierarchy.
Now the pronouncement of the Communist Politburo chaired by Xi Jinping: the two generals are guilty of «exceptionally serious crimes which have created immense damage.” Li Shangfhe is accused of «tradimento of the principles on which the Party is founded” and its predecessor Wei Fenghe of “having lost faith in the Party”. Between the lines of the excommunication one understands that the betrayal was directed against Xi Jinping, which in addition to being the political commander of the People’s Liberation Army (“The Party commands the rifle” had established Mao), he had also personally promoted the two officers to the top of the MMinistry of Defense.
Xi has committed to a cleaning of military rankswith the aim of relaunching the capabilities of combat of a numerically imposing but backward army, still ten years ago based on masses of infantry unprepared for the rapid and coordinated operations needed for a projection of force abroad worthy of a superpower. Xi, with a 2015 reform, has streamlined the infantry divisions and diverted spending to elite unit, aeronautics and navy.
But the first enemy to defeat is inside: it is the endemic corruption. According to the Politburo indictment, which amounts to a certain conviction at least forlife sentencethe two former ministers asked for and obtained “enormous sums of money” both in the field of military supplies both in the “provisions relating to the management of personnel”. This second charge highlights the dark evil: in the Chinese army one can make a career by bribing one’s superiors for get promotions. It is said that the system is so ingrained and widespread that the private pays to become a sergeant and so on up the chain of command, up to colonel who wants the rank of general.
Dice Bill Bishopauthor of the respected newsletter Sinocism: “Did Li Shangfu pay Wei Fenghe to advance his career? After all the work done against corruption, the Chinese Army continues to buy and sell promotions. It takes money to buy a rank and the salary is not enough for the bribe, so after paying for the appointment, you have to find a way to recover the expense.” chain of corruption.
Before becoming Defense Minister, General Wei Fenghe had commanded the missile force Chinese, spearhead of every modern army. And on the soldiers who have them in their hands nuclear weapons and conventional superpower of China the scythe of the anti-corruption investigation continues to fall: in August 2023 the generals were torpedoed Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbincommander and deputy of the missile divisions. It is particularly disturbing (not only for Xi but for international security) that men with such great responsibility would make decisions for personal gain.
In all, only based on the news published by Beijing press, in the last year, nine generals and three senior leaders of the military-industrial complex have fallen under the Party’s banner. The fact that Li Shangfu’s head also rolled after that purge shows that Xi and his Politburo cannot be sure of anyone, corruption is endemic.
Before briefly becoming a minister, General Li Shangfu (aerospace engineer) had headed a base for launching satellites and then from 2017 to early 2023 he was head of the “Department of Equipment Procurement and Development” of the People’s Liberation Army: a position that controls a colossal turnover and money.
«Li Shangfu has seriously polluted the equipment acquisition and related industries,” the indictment says.
Xi must not have had suspicions about the officer if he had promoted him to the top of the Ministry of Defencein the midst of a clean-up campaign. But in July 2023, his old Department, in a rare statement reported by the Beijing press, announced that it had engaged in a “clean-up” of the procedure for assigning procurement «and urged anyone with information about irregularities dating back to 2017 to report it to investigators. In August, Li stopped appearing in public. No official explanation for months.
Western “Pechinologists” imagined that the investigation it was also a revenge of theestablishment militare, a boycott of Xi’s moralizing action: if not even Li was pure, if everyone first paid and then imposed bribes to advance their careers, it is better to accept the situation and turn the page. Only last December, after five months of inconceivable emptiness for a superpower who needs to maintain political contacts at the highest level with the United Statesthe new Minister of Defense has been appointed: he is the admiral Dong Jun (Xi has invested heavily in the Navy, which in his plans should gain supremacy in the South China Sea).
Another of Xi’s worries is the «peace disease»: decades without combat experience, unlike American adversaries engaged by Somalia all’Iraq all’Afghanistan (even if they didn’t emerge well from those “asymmetric conflicts”).
The People’s Liberation Army has fought only once in the last fifty years, a quick clash with Vietnam in 1979. On the Himalayan frontier disputed with’India skirmishes are fought with spades, trench picks and nailed clubs, because a bilateral agreement prohibits them Weapons on the front line to avoid escalation. This did not prevent dozens of men from dying in a clash in June 2020.
Certainly, among the plans formulated by Xi’s generals there is one to “solve” the Taiwan question: reunification by force if political persuasion (threat) is not enough. But how formidable is China’s military apparatus? The numbers are impressive, for personnel in permanent service (2 million), aircraft (3,700 of which 500 bombers and 1,800 fighters), ships (370), missiles (500 with nuclear warheads). However, behind bullets and steel, there is the human factor to consider.
«We must repress the false combat capabilities“, the general said in March He Weidong, one of the two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission of which Xi is naturally Number 1. The “People’s Liberation Army Daily” he cited the case of «night drills» carried out «at sunset», when visibility is best to be able to write in the reports that the operation was a complete success.
On June 19 the agency Xinhua reported the key phrase uttered by the president during a meeting with the military: «Managers, especially high-level ones, must have the courage to put aside personal prestige and admit their weaknesses. Army cadres must reflect deeply and rectify their behavior and thoughts.” And significantly, to deliver his speech Xi went to Yan’an, the historic stronghold where theMaoist army it was confirmed at the end of the Long March.
Among the accusations that have now emerged in the investigation into the two former ministers there is also the «disloyalty and betrayal» towards the Party. Another phrase uttered by Xi in the last great indoctrination session of the high ranks in Yan’an: «The rifle must always be held by men loyal to the Party and politically reliable». A revisitation of Mao’s watchword. And this circumstance hides a serious underlying problem that according to analysts weighs on the real combat capacity of the Chinese armed forces. Their politicization implies that the first mission is the protection of the communist power, promotions to high command roles often depend on true or perceived loyalty to the Party, not on technical, tactical and strategic ability. In the last fifty years the bloodiest battle for the soldiers ofPeople’s Army it was with his own people: the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.
