I am reading the comments on the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi by his followers revolutionaries friends, that is, i resistant Houthis, i resistant Hezbollah, i resistant of Assad’s junta, and other interlocutors politically close to Tehran. His death is also commented on, of course, by many enemies.
Among the eulogies – the most effective – is the one that, according to many Iranian sources, was pronounced many years ago by Ayatollah Montazeri, first designated Khomeini’s successor, then removed and abandoned in the holy city of Qom. It was August 15, 1988 when Montazeri received the five members of what he was nicknamed the Committee of death: among them there was also Raisi who, at that time, sent 5,000 dissidents to the gallows.
On that occasion Montazeri would have said: «You committed the most serious crime in the Islamic Republic since the beginning of the revolution. In the future you will be remembered among the criminals of history.”
The designated Guide
Montazeri’s words explain the celebrations – in these hours – for Raisi’s death among many ordinary Iranians. But above all they explain why, at least in my opinion, Raisi’s death closes an era: the young dark persecutor, attacked by Khomeini’s heir, after becoming President of the Republic, dies, and with him the tragic theocratic era dries up, and perhaps we are moving towards the nationalist and militia one. We will see.
However, today we know that Iran’s first vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, will replace the late president Ebrahim Raisi for 50 days. Mokhber – leading figure in the definition ofresistance economy that the Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had asked of the Raisi executive – will have to govern in agreement with the president of parliament and the head of the judicial system, as required by the Constitution. Then the early presidential elections will be held.
But what can the early presidential elections change? Everyone knows that the Presidency of the Republic in Iran matters, but it doesn’t matter that much. The architrave on which the entire scaffolding – the Iranian system – is supported is the Guide of the Revolutiona position now held, since Khomenini’s death, by Ayatollah Khamenei: eighty-five years old and ill for some time.
Raisi, by all accounts, was the now designated dolphin, the Guide for the now imminent post-Khamenei era. Therefore, he was the new strongman of the system. He guaranteed, in that clericthe balance of a system that is now based more than on clerics, on pasdaranthat is, the militiamen guardians of Revolutionwith whom the cleric and hawk Raisi had good and consolidated relationships.
The discussion on the succession of the elderly Khamenei now seemed to be in full swing, imminent, prepared by surprising public and official statements. This is why a twist: if Khamenei’s health conditions had really been serious, the regime would never have been able to run the risk of finding itself with a President ad interim it’s a Guide of the Revolution hospitalized at the end of her life.
My impression is that the quick decision to entrust the interim presidency to Mokhber, for fifty days, seems to say that the discussion on replacing Khamenei can wait. Only Khamenei’s doctor can certify this hypothesis, certainly not me. But Khamenei struck a blow of vitality: and he did it immediately. His replacement appears to be on the waiting list for now.
In the hands of a loyalist
The image blow suffered by Iran is however serious: the country is committed to destabilizing the entire Middle East to conquer the place it believes is its rightful place.
Iran cannot afford to say that an attack or sabotage killed its President and its foreign minister, on homeland soil, without consequences that would contradict its choice to destabilize others to consolidate its own role, but without bring the war home. But it cannot even afford to admit that its aircraft are not capable of taking its leaders from Baku to Tehran – safely. Will bad weather hold up as the only justification?
Tehran therefore relies, for current affairs, on Mohammad Mokhber, architect of an economic policy that has caused the national currency to plummet, which in about a year has lost 50% of its value, to help the Pasdaran consolidate their power economic, authentic holding company for the militia export of the revolution and control of the main economic conglomerates in the country.
The creature that makes him a Khamenei loyalist is a charitable institution – named Carrying out Imam Khomeini’s orders (EIKO) – exempt from paying taxes. EIKO is a giant, an authentic conglomerate controlled in practice by Khamenei’s office, which is present in many sectors of the national economy.
A man who lived in the shadows, far from the stages of politics and controversy, could he be Raisi’s true successor? It’s too early to tell, but the real question is whether Raisi’s death will lead to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, also a cleric. In this case, perhaps, a Pasdaran could return to the Presidency, after Ahmadinejad’s sad precedent.
It is said that Khamenei the father favored the rise of his son among the hawks of the regime, but by focusing on Raisi he intended to avoid the scenario of his son succeeding him in the supreme position, and for this reason he would have built the structure of tomorrow on Raisi .
What future opens up?
Islamic history has seen the caliphal dynasties, that of the Umayyads and that of the Abbasids to name the best known. The history of Persia – too – has seen the great (or small) dynasties of the shahs, the last of which was, as is known, that of the Pahlevi. Now the Iranian Islamic Republic may find itself forced to inaugurate the revolutionary republican dynasty: it would be a scenario of closure, of entrenchment. Perhaps this is why Ayatollah Khamenei had to bet on himself again.
The point of Ebrahim Raisi’s death does not constitute a change in Iran’s line because he was not the one dictating it. While Khamanei remains firmly in power. The problem lies in the internal rebalancing, which Khamenei must now define, without the man they had decided to bet on. Today in Tehran, power is in the hands of the supreme theocratic-religious authority, of its offices, that is, of the mullahs of its court and the pasdaran, faithful guardians. Will the balance of power still remain the same in the future?
