In Iran, the collapse of the rial, inflation and sanctions are not just an economic problem: they become proof of the failure of the system. The fact that the protest starts from the bazaars signals a deep fracture in the social coalition that supports the regime. The changes at the top of the economy appear more like “scapegoats” than real changes, because the causes are structural. Without an organized alternative, the most plausible scenario is long attrition: repression, cosmetic concessions and growing vulnerability to shocks.
We talk about it with Andrea Molle, political scientist at Chapman University (USA).
How much does the economic factor (collapse of the rial, inflation, sanctions) really matter in triggering protests, and when does it become an openly political crisis?
The economic factor is central, but not in the reductive sense of a “bread riot”. The collapse of the rial, persistent inflation and the cumulative effect of sanctions act as a detonator, not as an ultimate cause. In Iran the economy is never neutral. It is immediately read as an expression of a system of power, strategic choices and political priorities. As long as the economic crisis can be perceived as temporary or “manageable”, it remains confined to the register of social discontent. It becomes a political crisis when the idea takes hold that there is no longer a way out within the system, that the worsening is not accidental but structural. At that point the economy ceases to be a technical variable and becomes the empirical proof of the failure of the pact between regime and society: sacrifices without perspective, mobilization without return, resistance without reward. It is there that public discourse shifts from management to the very sense of power.
What value does the fact that the protests started from the bazaars, historically considered a pillar of the system, have? Is this a sign of breakdown of the “social pact”?
The fact that the protest emerges from the bazaars is perhaps the most politically significant signal. Historically, the bazaars are not a marginal segment or ideologically hostile to the regime: on the contrary, they have been one of its social pillars, a basis of stability, intermediation and legitimation. When those who have an interest in continuity protest, it means that the system no longer guarantees even the minimal survival of its natural supporters. This is not simply discontent, but a breakdown of the implicit social pact on which the Islamic Republic was based, one by which political and religious elites offered order, protection and economic access in exchange for loyalty and acceptance. If this social bloc also slips away, the problem is no longer repression in the streets, but the disintegration of the coalition that makes the country governable.
Is the removal/exit of the central bank top management a real change of direction or just a “scapegoat” to buy time?
The removal or exit of the central bank’s top management should be read primarily as a symbolic act, not as a paradigm shift. It is a classic operation of discharging responsibility: personalizing the crisis to depoliticize it, offering a face to failure to preserve the architecture of power. This type of move can have a tactical utility, that of slowing down the pressure, giving the illusion of control, buying time, but it does not affect the root causes. The Iranian problem is not isolated monetary mismanagement, but rather an economic model subordinated to ideological and geopolitical priorities that drain resources without generating development. Until this changes, every individual sacrifice only serves to postpone the moment of reckoning.
Is the rhetoric of “total war” against the USA, Israel and Europe just propaganda or does it indicate growing internal vulnerability? And how is it intertwined with regional strategy (proxies, tensions in the Gulf)?
The rhetoric of total war against the United States, Israel and Europe is not just propaganda: it is also an indicator of internal fragility. When a regime insists on external siege it is often because it struggles to explain the present to its citizens. The external threat serves to unite, to justify sacrifices, to transform internal failure into defensive heroism. However, this strategy is intertwined in an increasingly problematic way with the regional dimension: the use of proxies, tensions in the Gulf, indirect confrontation with Israel are tools of deterrence, but they have a growing economic and political cost. For an impoverished population, the contrast between regional ambitions and daily life becomes increasingly stark. The stronger the regime appears on the outside, the more it risks appearing distant and indifferent on the inside. It’s a spiral: internal vulnerability fuels rhetorical aggression, which in turn increases isolation and economic pressures, worsening social malaise.
Does the comparison with 1978–79 hold up? What are the similarities and above all the differences today (absence of an organized alternative)? Which scenario is more plausible: repression, reform, or “dragging” to a breaking point?
The comparison with 1978–79 holds up, if only partially. The main similarity lies in the dynamics of accumulation: even then the revolution did not explode due to a single event, but due to a sum of economic, social and symbolic fractures that made the regime incapable of imagining the future. Today, as then, power appears to lack a credible long-term narrative. The decisive difference, however, is the absence of an organized alternative. In 1979 there was a leadership, a network, an ideology ready to occupy the void. Today dissent is widespread, profound, but fragmented. This makes a rapid collapse less likely and a drag-out scenario more plausible: intermittent repression, cosmetic concessions, militarization of public discourse and progressive consumption of residual legitimacy. Real reforms would require a radical revision of the ideological structure of the system, so they appear unlikely. The risk is not so much an imminent revolution as a slow erosion that makes the regime increasingly dependent on coercion and therefore, paradoxically, increasingly vulnerable to future shocks.
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